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As one of the most efficient solutions to complex and large-scale problems, multi-agent
cooperation has been in the limelight for the past few decades. Recently, many research
projects have focused on context-aware cooperation to dynamically provide complex
services. As cooperation in the multi-agent systems (MASs) becomes more common,
guaranteeing the security of such cooperation takes on even greater importance. However,
existing security models do not reflect the agents’ unique features, including cooperation
and context-awareness. In this paper, we propose a Community-based Role interaction-
based Access Control model (CRiBAC) to allow secure cooperation in MASs. To do this,
we refine and extend our preliminary RiBAC model, which was proposed earlier to support
secure interactions among agents, by introducing a new concept of interaction permission,
and then extend it to CRiBAC to support community-based cooperation among agents. We
analyze potential problems related to interaction permissions and propose two approaches
to address them. We also propose an administration model to facilitate administration of
CRiBAC policies. Finally, we present the implementation of a prototype system based on
a sample scenario to assess the proposed work and show its feasibility.
ª 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction Cooperative Work (CSCW). Several MASs that provideThe rapid growth of networking technologies has signifi-
cantly promoted the level of connectivity and interaction
among distributed computing elements. Particularly, multi-
agent systems (MASs) that feature rich interactions among
agents have become a very active area of research. The rich
interactions among agents promote seamless cooperation
that has potential to address large and complicated problems
which cannot be solved by an individual agent. Such benefits
have been the key reasons that many researchers have been
studying cooperation approaches for decades in many areas
such as swarm intelligence, MAS, and Computer Supported5; fax: þ1 352 392 5040.
unajung@gmail.com (Y. J
8.
ier Ltd. All rights reservedservices through cooperation among agents have been
proposed in the literature, including, Gaia (Zambonelli et al.,
2003), Pervasive Information Community Organization (PICO)
(Kumar et al., 2003), and Community Computing (Jung and
Kim, 2010). Unlike cooperation in other areas, dynamic
cooperation in MASs has been regarded as a critical issue due
to the agent’s autonomous and dynamic characteristics.
Current MASs support the context-awareness necessary for
dynamic cooperation to some degree (Zambonelli et al., 2003;
Kumar et al., 2003; Jung and Kim, 2010); however, these
systems pose significant adoption challenges because of
security concerns.ung), jjoshi@pitt.edu (J.B.D. Joshi).
.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 4 9 7e5 2 3498In particular, access control is one of the critical security
issues facing MASs. Several access control models have been
proposed in the literature that may be adopted for MASs.
Among them, the Role-based Access Control (RBAC) approach
has generated significant interest because of its flexibility and
potential benefits (Sandhu et al., 1996). All existing access
control models e including RBAC e aim to protect objects/
information against unauthorized accesses; however, they do
not consider interactions among agents. In particular, inMASs,
we need to carefully examine interactions as well as objects.
During an interaction among agents, an agent might need to
perform operations on a partnering agent or ask the partner to
execute its task. However, serious security issues exist that are
related to allowing such interactions or accesses between
partnering agents without proper authorization verification
(Jung et al., 2011). One partner may attempt to execute critical
actions within another partner’s system, such as, changing the
partner’s status or using the partner’s functionality without
appropriate authorization. Therefore,weneed a suitable access
control model to ensure that authorized agents can execute
only authorized interactions. Beyond interaction among
agents, MASs need to guarantee secure dynamic cooperation
among agents in order to provide complex and diverse sets of
services. To do so, we need an access control model that
supports an agent’s dynamic behavior and the its need for
cooperation with other agents simultaneously.
Tofulfill suchrequirements,wepropose theRole-interaction
based Access Control Model (RiBAC) that considers an interac-
tion between roles as an entity that also needs to be protected.
RiBAC extends the types of protection objects in traditional
RBAC by incorporating authorized role-based interactions
amongagents. ByemployingRiBAC, thedevelopers ofMASs can
enable agents to block misuse of its services by others. Previ-
ously, we have proposed an early version of RiBAC in Jung et al.
(2009), which we refine and extend in this paper. Then, we
propose the community-based RiBAC (CRiBAC) model as an
extension of RiBAC by incorporating the concept of community
that refers to a cooperative group of agents. Thismodel aims to
guarantee the securityofdynamiccooperationamongagents as
well as the interactions among them. In particular, CRiBAC is
basedon the community computingparadigmproposed in Jung
andKim (2010),which isanagent-basedcomputingparadigmin
which services are provided through cooperation among
agents. By importing its community concept, CRiBAC can deal
with context-aware cooperation among agents. We also
propose an administration model for CRiBAC, called ACRiBAC,
to help administer CRiBAC policies in MAS-based applications.
ACRiBAC includes a grant model, a revocation model, and
administration functions for cooperation. We also present
a technique to analyze the conflicts that may result due to the
permitted interactions during cooperation. Finally, we present
the implementation of a prototype system to demonstrate our
work using an emergency scenario. In summary, the major
contributions of our work are as follows:
- we propose the RiBAC model to support the security of
agent interactions.
- we propose the CRiBAC model to deal with the context-
aware secure cooperation among agents as well as the
secure interactions within a community setting.- we propose the ACRiBAC model to support the adminis-
tration of systems employing CRiBAC.
- we develop an analysis technique to verify the CRiBAC
policies.
- we implement the visual user interfaces to help specify and
analyze CRiBAC policies.
- we implement a prototype based on an emergency scenario
to demonstrate the practical feasibility of the proposed
CRiBAC model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we present a brief description of community computing and
our motivation for the current work. Then, in Section 3, we
propose the family of RiBAC models. We propose the CRiBAC
model in Section 4. Next, we analyze a number of conflicting
scenarios related to interaction permissions and then provide
two solutions in Section 5. In Section 6, we propose the
ACRiBAC model. In Section 7, we present the implementation
of a prototype system and assess the feasibility and the
usefulness of the proposed work. In Section 8, we discuss
related work; finally, we present the conclusions and future
work to be investigated in Section 9.2. Preliminaries and motivation
In this section, we first introduce the community computing
paradigm and examine the access control issues in such
cooperative MASs. Then, we present our motivation for the
proposed models.
2.1. Community computing
Community Computing (CC) is an agent-based computing
paradigm where services are provided through dynamic
cooperation among individual agents (Jung and Kim, 2010).
Ordinarily, each agent performs its own task or set of tasks in
a community computing system (CCS), known as a society.
When a goal is identified, a community is formed by defining
the necessary roles and the cooperation processes among
roles; then, the community is dynamically created by
recruiting the best available agents for each role. To achieve
a goal, cooperation among community members begins as
soon as all of the members are selected and the community is
created. After the goal is achieved, the community is dissolved
and members are released. When an agent participates in
a community, it needs to perform tasks to play a community
role(s). Therefore, agents should check their abilities as well as
their willingness to participate before accepting a role as
a community member. Once a community is established, the
community’s structure (such as its roles and cooperation
processes), can be reused for another community having the
same community goal. In Fig. 1, a general overview of CC is
presented and its specification is shown in Table 1.
The basic concepts used in CC are as follows:
- Community e is a goal-oriented cooperative group of agents
which take on one or more community roles. It is dynami-
cally created and dissolved when the goals have been
attained. All communities should belong to a society.
Community
Community
: Agent  (User)
Society
: Agent taking a 
society 
role and a 
community
role at the same time
: Agent taking a 
society role
(1 circle/1 role)
: Agent taking a     
community role
(1 circle/1 role)
Fig. 1 e Overview of community computing.
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society has several communities, each of which has several
agents. All agents who belong to a society take on one or
more society roles as long as they are part of the society.
- Agente is a basicunit of societiesand communities, having its
own intelligence, tasks, and context information. While
agentsaredoingtheirownworkasasocietymember, theycan
also participate in one or more communities simultaneously.
2.2. Motivation
Ubiquitous services are currently being expanded to various
applications suchasu-healthcare, u-government, u-city, and so
on. For practical adoption of such emerging services, security
issues are key challenges. In order to provide secure services,
CCSs for ubiquitous applications should incorporate efficient
securitymechanisms. There aremany security issues related to
ubiquitous computing systems such as authentication, privacy,
and access control. In this paper, we concentrate on the access
control issues.Table 1 e The simplified community computing model (CCM) f
Element (Abbr.) Definition
Context (CONT ) The set of all context informa
Task (TSK ) The set of all tasks performed
Agent (a) <CONTa, TSKa> An agent has its own contexts
which represent the status of
A is the set of all agents in a s
Society Role (SR) A set of all society roles in a s
belong to a society.
Community Role (CR) A set of all community roles in
one or more community roles
those agents when the commu
Role (R) SR W CR The set of all roles in a society
Role Member (Ar) Ar ˛ A A set of agents taking a role r.
Goal (G) The set of goals of communiti
Community (c) <gc, CRc, Ac> A community c has a goal ( gc)
take on one or more commun
Ac ˛ A. C is the set of all such
Society (S ) <C, A> A community computing syste
mission-oriented communitieIn CCSs in which agents frequently interact with each
other, it is important to control access to not only resources
but also to agents’ tasks or agents themselves. An agent can
interact with its partner to execute the partner’s tasks or to
carry out its own tasks on the partner; such interactions can
result in some critical security problems. It can be assumed
that a smart home environment is one in which intelligent
appliances are deployed and all family members have
personal agents located on their own personal devices. A door
lock agent can reset the password and perform such a task
only for an authorized agent, e.g., the owner agent which
represents the owner of the house. If an unauthorized entity
(such as a neighbor’s personal device) asks to reset the pass-
word via remote access, the door lock must reject the request
for safety/security reasons. Similarly, only the owner should
be able to open a safe. Otherwise, the safe should sound an
alarm to prevent unauthorized access. It can be a significant
security vulnerability to accept unauthorized accesses to
agents or agents’ tasks. Therefore, we need a proper access
control mechanism to ensure that agents are engaged in only
authorized activities. As a solution, we propose the Role
Interaction based Access Control Model (RiBAC). In RiBAC, an
interaction indicates an access to agents or agents’ resources,
such as information or a task; only acceptable interactions
among agents based on roles are permitted.
Beyond the interactions among agents, it is important to
consider the issue of cooperation among agents playing
different roles. Over the last few decades, researchers have
studied and developed cooperation systems because they can
lead to effective ways to solve complex and large-scale prob-
lems. RiBAC can be used to ensure secure interactions;
however, this is not enough for some cooperation systems. To
secure cooperation, it is necessary that a guarantee that their
cooperation does not lead to security threats exists. In order to
do this, we propose CRiBAC, the Community based RiBAC
model. CRiBAC employs the cooperation paradigm of the
community computing approach. By using the community
concept of community computing, we can control accesses inor CRiBAC.
Description
tion which represents agents’ status in a society.
by agents in a society.
and tasks, a ¼ <CONTa, TSKa>. CONTa ˛ CONT is a set of contexts
an agent a, and TSKa ˛ TSK is a set of tasks that an agent a can do.
ociety.
ociety. Each agent takes one or more society roles when they
a society. Each agent participating in a community has to take
in the community, but community roles should be revoked from
nity is terminated.
.
es in a society.
, necessary community roles (CRc) and community agents (Ac) who
ity roles to achieve the goal gc. c ¼ <gc, CRc, Ac>, gc ˛ G, CRc ˛ CR, and
communities in a society.
m (CCS) which provides cooperative services by dynamic and
s. A society consists of a set of communities C and a set of agents A.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 4 9 7e5 2 3500a cooperation system more intuitively and conveniently. For
example, to organize a community and to control cooperation
among its agents, CRiBAC can be used to specify the
community-related information such as the community’s
goal, roles, participants, and context within which it cooper-
ates. When seeking suitable agents to create a community,
such information might be quite useful to examine partici-
pating communities and confirm the community roles of
a candidate agent aswell as the candidate’s tasks and context.
Such information is also necessary for an agent to determine
whether or not it wants to authorize other agents to interact
with it. Furthermore, for efficient administration, it is much
better to specify a cooperation group and corresponding
relationships in the access control model. For these afore-
mentioned reasons, in this paper, we propose CRiBAC by
extending RiBAC.3. RiBAC
RiBAC (Jung et al., 2009) is based on role-based agent interac-
tions to protect not only resources in MASs, but also the
agents’ tasks and the agents themselves. In order to do so, an
interaction between agents in RiBAC is regarded as an access
to a partner’s task or to the partner itself. In this section, we
propose the interaction permissions in RiBAC and the RiBAC
family. A general overview of RiBAC is shown in Fig. 23.1. Interaction permissions
RiBAC includes two types of role interactions: Role-Oriented
(RO) interactions and Task-Oriented (TO) interactions (See
Fig. 4). The RO interaction indicates that a subject role (Rs)
initiating an interaction performs its operation on a targeted
object role (Ro), while the TO interaction indicates that Rs
commands its Ro to perform Ro’s tasks. For example, a para-
medic can transfer a patient to an ambulance or a hospital.
Such interaction between a paramedic and a patient is a RO
interaction. In this interaction, the paramedic is a subject role
and the patient is an object role. In addition, a doctor who is in
charge of the patient can order the paramedic to provide a first-
aid instruction. This interaction between the paramedic role
and the doctor role is a TO interaction. The doctor is a subject
role and its object role is the paramedic. For a successful role
interaction, a subject role must have corresponding interac-
tion permissions and, in case of TO interaction, its object roleAGENTS ROLES
SESSIONS
AA
RH
C
Fig. 2 e RiBACshould have all the permissions necessary for accomplishing
the requested tasks.
Permissions in RiBAC include object-oriented permissions
(OPRMS ) and the two interaction permissions mentioned
above. Depending on the application needs, various objects
may exist in an environmentwhich can be accessed by agents.
A valid pair of an object and an operation on that object forms
an OPRMS. A valid pair of an operation of a subject role and its
target role forms a role-oriented permission (RPRMS ). A
TPRMS consists of a role and its task which can be invoked by
other roles. Roles are authorized for permissions that are
assigned to them through the permission assignment (PA).3.2. RiBAC family
RiBAC is comprised of a family of four models: Basic RiBAC
(RiBAC-B), Hierarchical RiBAC (RiBAC-H), Constrained RiBAC
(RiBAC-C), and Constrained Hierarchical RiBAC (RiBAC-CH).
RiBAC-B is the base model to control role interactions. RiBAC-
H extends RiBAC-B with a role hierarchy for the convenient
management of permissions. RiBAC-C supports RiBAC-B and
also allows constraints to support more fine-grained access
control requirements. RiBAC-CH supports both RiBAC-Hybrid
Hierarchy (HH) and RiBAC-C. In Table 2, we provide the formal
definitions for each model.
To specify the proposed models, in this paper, we propose
the XML-based specification language. Due to its extensibility
and interoperability, XML has been widely used as a policy
language for enterprise-wide access control in the distributed
environment in which highly heterogeneous entities collab-
orate (Bhatti et al., 2005). In an effort to use XML as a standard
specification of access control policy, XML-based Access
Control Language (XACML) has been proposed (XACML v.3.0,
2010). To support RBAC, XACML includes the RBAC profile
XACML v.3 Core Hierarchical RBAC Profile v.1.0 (2010) but
current profile does not support essential features of RBAC
such as separation of duty (SoD) constraints and role hier-
archy (Ferrini and Bertino, 2009). To overcome the shortcom-
ings of XACML, Bhatti et al. proposed X-GTRBAC, an XML-
based specification language based on the GTRBAC model
(Bhatti et al., 2005). X-GTRBAC captures not only the seman-
tics of XACML but also the semantics of RBAC’s constraints
and role hierarchy. In addition, it addresses the context-
awareness, in particular temporal context, for dynamic fine-
grained access control. In this paper, we propose a specifica-
tion language for each proposed model based on X-GTRBAC.PA
OP
A
TPA
PERMISSIONS
OPRMS
RPRMS
TPRMS
ONSTRAINTS
RPA
overview.
AGENTS SESSIONS
RH
COMMUNITY
PRMS
CR
SR
PA SPRMS
RPRMS
TPRMS
ROLES
SOCIETY
OPRMS
iPRMS
Fig. 3 e Overview of CRiBAC.
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Grammar (Bhatti et al., 2005), a BNF-like grammar, instead of
presenting XML schemas. Using BNF notion and XML’s tagging
notation allows better readability and presentation.
- RiBAC-B: This is the basic model which deals with accesses
to agents or to tasks belong to those agents based on agents’
roles. The formal definition is shown in the following Table
2 and the corresponding specification is shown in the
Appendix A-1.
- RiBAC-H: For better permission management and inheri-
tance, in RiBAC-H, permissions including object-oriented
and interaction permissions can be inherited through
a role hierarchy and override the authorization functions
in RiBAC-B. We define the role hierarchy (RH ) as shown in
Table 2. In the specification of RiBAC-H, there is a change
in the role definition only, as presented in the Appendix
A-2(a).
- RiBAC-C: This model adds separation of duty (SoD) and
cardinality constraints to RiBAC-B as presented in Table 2.
SoD constraints have been examined in the RBAC literature;
they serve as a mechanism to minimize the likelihood of
fraud and major errors through simultaneous access by
agents to key organizational tasks or deliberate collusion by
agents. Community computing environments have similar Role-Oriented(RO) Inte
RS R
PA
T1 TS
AA
AA
Task of A1
ops Capable-of
reSource-Oriented(SO) Interaction
RS SPRMS
PA (ops, S2)AA
SPRMS
own
S2
AA
ops
a b
Fig. 4 e Interaction permissions detaivulnerabilities. As a remedy, we propose the static and
dynamic SoD constraints for RiBAC. In the static SoD (SSoD),
no agent can be assigned to more than a specific number of
roles ina role set. In contrast to SSoD, thedynamicSoD (DSoD)
enforces the SoD constraint on role activations instead of
agent-role assignments (AA). As a consequence, an agent
cannot activate certain roles together in one session. Also,
RiBAC-C supports cardinality constraints that limit the
number of agents that may be assigned to a role. The cardi-
nality constraints can be static or dynamic. Static cardinality
constraints are applicable to the AA relationship, while
dynamic cardinality constraints are imposed on active roles
in agents’ sessions. Moreover, cardinality constraints can be
considered as minimum and maximum limitations. We
define four different cardinality constraints: SSoD_Min_Car-
dinality, SSoD_Max_Cardinality, DSoD_Min_Cardinality, and
DSoD_Max_Cardinality.Note that caremustbe taken toensure
the consistency of the policy by avoiding definition of con-
flicting constraints.A staticminimumcardinality ofm should
be less than a static maximum cardinality of n (m < n) for
a role. The specification of RiBAC-C is presented in the
Appendix A-2(b).
- RiBAC-CH: RiBAC-CH is formed by a combination of hierar-
chical and constrained RiBAC models. However, the impli-
cations of such a combination should be precisely captured.raction Task-Oriented(TO) Interaction
PRMS RS TPRMS
(ops, Ro)
KPRM
RPRMS PA (OPS, RO.T2)AA
TPRMS
Capable-of
Task of A2
PA P1
T2 TSKPRM
AA
(OPS, RO.P1) ops
If T2 requires P1 
c
led with relationships in CRiBAC.
Table 2 e Formal definition of the family of RiBAC models: RiBAC-B, RiBAC-H, RiBAC-C, and RiBAC-CH.
Model Element Definition Description
RiBAC-B A The set of all agents in a system, an agent a has his/her own
tasks. a ¼ {TSKa}, TSKa ˛ TSK is a set of a’s tasks.
TSK ACT W OPS The set of all tasks which agents can do.
ACT The set of all actions of roles which do not require any targets
like walking and speaking.
OPS The set of all applicable operations of roles on OBJ. Some tasks
need one or more permission(s) and such a relationship
between an agent’s task and permission is represented by
TSKPRM.
TSKPRM 4TSK  P A many-to-many task to permission relationship. This
relationship represents a necessary permission(s) to perform
a task.
R The set of all roles available in a society. The following function
retrieves the authorized roles of an agent a according to the
policy: authorized_roles(a:A)/2R, the mapping of agent a to the
set of its authorized roles that it can activate.
OBJ OBJs W OBJ-ROLE
W OBJ-TSK
The set of all target objects of OPS and it can be a system object,
role, or role’s task.
P OPRMS W RPRMS
W TPRMS
A set of permissions in a society. The following function
retrieves the authorized permissions of a role r according to the
policy: authorized_prms(r:R)/ 2OPRMS W RPRMS W TPRMS, the
mapping of role r to the set of its authorized permissions
including object-oriented permissions and interaction
permissions. Formally: authorized_prms(r) ¼ authorized_oprms(r)
W authorized_rprms(r) W authorized_tprms(r)
OPRMS 4OPS  OBJs The set of all object-oriented permissions. Retrieval function:
authorized_oprms(r:R)/ 2OPRMS, themapping of role r to the set of
its authorized oprms.
RPRMS 4OPS  OBJ-ROLE The set of all role-oriented permissions. Retrieval function:
authorized_rprms(r:R)/ 2RPRMS, themapping of role r to the set of
its authorized rprms.
TPRMS 4OPS  OBJ-TSK The set of all task-oriented permissions. Through
a corresponding TSKPRM relationship, it can be specified as
TPRMS 4 OPS  OBJ-ROLE.OBJ-PRMS where OBJ-PRMS 4 P,
(OBJ-ROLE, OBJ-PRMS)4 PA, and (OBJ-TSK, OBJ-PRMS)4
TSKPRM. Retrieval function: authorized_tprms(r:R)/ 2TPRMS, the
mapping of role r to the set of its authorized tprms.
OBJs The set of a system’s objects/resources.
OBJ-ROLE 4R The set of roles that can be an object of an operation ops.
OBJ-TSK 4TSK The set of tasks which can be a target object of a tprms.
PA {OPA W RPA
W TPA} 4 R  P
A many-to-many role to permission assignment relationship.
OPA 4R  OPRMS A many-to-many role to object-oriented permission
assignment relationship.
RPA 4R  RPRMS A many-to-many role to role-oriented permission assignment
relationship.
TPA 4R  TPRMS A many-to-many role to task-oriented permission assignment
relationship.
S The set of all sessions created for agents in a society. The
following relationships capture the runtime state of access
control through sessions: SessionAgents(s:S)/A, themapping of
session s to its corresponding agent, and SessionRoles(s:S)/ 2R,
the mapping of session s to the set of active roles in it.
RiBAC-H RH 4R  R A partial order relationship for R, denoted as, where r r’ only
if all permissions of r’ are inherited by r and agents assigned to r
can also activate r’.
RiBAC-C SSoD 42R  N Acollectionofpairs (rs,n) thatdefinesSSoDs,where for each (rs,n)
noagent shouldbeassigned tonormore roles fromthesetof roles
rs. Formally: (rs, n)˛ SSoD0e a˛ A, jauthorized_roles(a)X rsj  n.
DSoD 42R  N A collection of pairs (rs, n) that defines DSoDs, where for each
(rs, n) no agent can activate n or more roles from the set of roles
rs together in one session. Formally: (rs, n) ˛ DSoD0 es ˛
SESSIONS, j{r ˛ SessionRoles (s)jr ˛ rs}j  n. SMinCardinality 4
R  N, a collection of pairs (r, n) that defines static minimum
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Table 2 e (continued )
Model Element Definition Description
cardinality for roles, where for each (r, n) at least n agents
should be assigned to the role r.
SMax e Cardinality 4R  N A collection of pairs (r, n) that defines static maximum
cardinality for roles, where for each (r, n) at most n agents
should be assigned to the role r. Formally: (r, n) ˛
SMaxCardinality0 j{a˛ Aj r ˛ authorized_roles (a)}j  n
DMin e Cardinality 4R  N A collection of pairs (r, n) that defines dynamic minimum
cardinality for roles, where for each (r, n) at least n agents
should have activated the role r at a particular time.
DMax e Cardinality 4R  N A collection of pairs (r, n) that defines dynamic maximum
cardinality for roles, where for each (r, n) at most n agents
should be allowed to activate the role r at a particular time.
Formally: (r, n)˛DMaxCardinality0j{s˛ Sj r˛ SessionRoles(s)}j  n.
RiBAC-CH DSoD 42R  N A collection of pairs (rs, n) that defines dynamic SoDs in
presence of hybrid hierarchy, where for each (rs, n) no agent can
activate or use permissions of n or more roles from the set rs
together in one session. Formally: (rs, n) ˛ DSoD0 es ˛ S, j{rj
r’ I r, r’ ˛ rs, r’ ˛ SessionRoles (s)}j  n.
DMin e Cardinality 4R  N A collection of pairs (r, n) that defines dynamic minimum
cardinality for roles in presence of hybrid hierarchy, where for
each (r, n) at least n agents should have activated the role r or its
I-senior at a particular time. Formally: (r, n) ˛ DMinCardinality0
j{s ˛ Sj r’ I r, r’ ˛ SessionRoles (s)}j  n.
DMax e Cardinality 4R  N A collection of pairs (r, n) that defines dynamic maximum
cardinality for roles in presence of hybrid hierarchy, where for
each (r, n) at most n agents should be allowed to activate the role
r at a particular time. Formally: (r, n) ˛ DMaxCardinality0 j{s ˛ S
jr’ I r, r’ ˛ SessionRoles (s)}j  n.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 1 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 4 9 7e5 2 3 503For instance, assume that role r1 has a dynamic maximum
cardinality constraint of 3, and that role r2 is senior to r1
(r2  r1). In such a configuration, if more than 3 agents acti-
vate r2 it can be interpreted as violation of the cardinality
constraint because agents assigned to r2 can also assume r1
through the role hierarchy. However, agents acting as role r2
may not necessarily act as role r1 all the time, which makes
the earlier interpretation too rigid. In order to provide more
flexibility and to truly capture the behavior of constraints in
the presence of role hierarchy, we adopt the notion of Hybrid
Hierarchy (HH ) that is originally defined in the context of
Generalized Temporal RBAC (GTRBAC ) (Joshi et al., 2005). In
comparison with the standard RBAC hierarchy, hybrid hier-
archy differentiates between permission usage and role
activation semantics in a hierarchy, by taking into account
three possible relationships: permission inheritance (I ),
activation (A), and inheritance-activation (IA). If role r1 is I-
senior to role r2 (r1 I r2), it inherits all the permissions r2 has.
If role r1 isA-senior to role r2 (r1  Ar2), then an agent assigned
to r1 can activate r2 but the role r1 does not inherit r2’s
permissions. Finally, r1 is IA-senior to r2 if and only if r1 is both
I-senior and A-Senior to r2 (r1  IAr2). By leveraging the acti-
vation and permission inheritance relationships, we achieve
more flexibility in policy specification. For instance, to
resolve the problem in the aforementioned example, we can
specify r2 as an A-senior to r1. Therefore, whenever an agent
activates r2, the cardinality constraint is respected, and an
agent can also activate the role r1 whenever needed but
according to the cardinality constraint. In Appendix A-2(c),
we show the specification of RiBAC-CH.4. Community based RiBAC (CRiBAC)
As mentioned in Section 2.2, it is very important to address
cooperation among agents beyond interaction between them.
To address the requirements, we propose CRiBAC by extending
RiBAC with the concept of community. In this section, we
present its formal definition and two example scenarios.4.1. Formal definition
CRiBAC aims to support cooperation among agents within
a community, as well as decentralized interactions between
agentswhodo or donot participate in a community. In CRiBAC,
cooperation is required to achieve a community’s goal and is
regarded as a set of interactions among community members
based on the roles that they assume. CRiBAC extends RiBAC to
provide support for handling secure cooperation among agents
using the various information and requirements related to
individual communities. To do so, CRiBAC adopts the cooper-
ation mechanism of CCM such that community creation by
recruiting suitable agents is based on their context and capa-
bilities. Fig. 3 provides an overview of the CRiBACmodel and its
formal definition is presented in Table 3.
In CRiBAC, a society consists of communities and agents.
All agents and their communities cooperating in a society
should be registered with their society. By registering in
a society, each agent is assigned to one or more society roles
(SR) depending on the agents’ contexts and tasks. All SRs are
defined by administrators at the time that the society is
Table 3 e Formal definition of the CRiBAC model.
Element Definition Description
RSC The set of resources that agents own.
CONT CONTs W CONTc W CONTa The set of all possible contexts which represent a society, communities, or agents.
TSK The set of all tasks which agents can have. Some tasks need one or more
permission(s) and such a relationship between an agent’s task and permission is
represented by TSKPRM.
a <RSCa, CONTa, TSKa> An agent a in A has own resources (RSCa3 RSC ), contexts (CONTa 3 CONT ), and
tasks (TSKa3 TSK ). Formally: a ¼ <RSCa, CONTa, TSKa>. A is the set of all agents in
a society
SR The set of all society roles
CR The set of all community roles.
R SR W CR The set of all roles available in a society.
c <gc, CRc, Ac, CONTc> A community has its goals (gc˛G), a set of community roles (CRc3 CR), a set of agents
(Ac3 A), and own contexts (CONTc3 CONT). Formally: c ¼ <gc, CRc, Ac, CONTc>. C is
the set of all possible communities in a society.
OBJ OBJs W OBJ-RSC W OBJ-ROLE W OBJ-TSK The set of all target objects of OPS and it can be a social object, agents’ resources, role,
or role’s task.
OBJ-RSC OBJ-RSC 4 RSC The set of resources that can be an object of a role’s operation.
OBJ-ROLE OBJ-ROLE4 R The set of roles that can be an object of a role’s operation.
OBJ-TSK OBJ-TSK 4 TSK The set of tasks that can be a target object of a task-oriented permission.
OPS The set of all applicable operations on OBJ, where OPS4 TSK.
S <C, A, OBJs, CONTs> A society s represents an entire cooperative system and it has a set of communities
(C ), a set of agents (A), a set of society objects (OBJs), and a set of society contexts
(CONTs). OBJs ˛ OBJ is a set of objects which belong to a society and the society
controls accesses from agents to society objects by PA to OBJs. CONTs ˛ CONT is a set
of context information representing a society and it is available to any agents in
a society.
OPRMS OPS  OBJ The set of all object-oriented permissions.
SPRMS OPS  RSC The set of all resource-oriented permissions.
RPRMS OPS  OBJ-ROLE The set of all role-oriented permissions, where OBJ-ROLE 4 R.
TPRMS OPS  OBJ-TSK The set of all task-oriented permissions. Through the corresponding TSKPPRM
relationship, it can be redefined as TPRMS 4 OPS  OBJ-ROLE.OBJ-PRMS where (obj-
role, obj-prms) 4 PA and (obj-tsk, obj-prms) 4 TSKPRM.
TSKPRM TSK  P A many-to-many task to permission relationship. This relationship represents
a necessary permission(s) to perform a task.
P OPRMS W RPRMS W TPRMS A set of permissions in a society.
PA {OPA W SPA W RPA W TPA} 4 R  P A many-to-many role to permission assignment relationship, where OPA4
R  OPRMS, SPA 4 R  SPRMS, RPA 4 R  RPRMS, and TPA4 R  TPRMS.
AA SRA W CRA Amany-to-many agent to R assignment relationship, where SRA4A SR and CRA4
A  CR
SS The set of all sessions created for agents in a society.
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objects in traditional RiBAC, and society contexts (CONTs) that
represent information relate to a society. An agent needs to
register with the society to gain access to a society’s contexts
or objects, or interact with other agents in the society.
However, any society role assigned to an agent is revoked
when the agent leaves the society.
In CRiBAC, an agent can participate in one or more
communities to help achieve the communities’ goals by taking
roles from CR, for as long as it belongs to the corresponding
society. A community c consists of the community roles (CRc),
agents playing community roles (Ac), and the community
context (CONTc). CONTc represents information related to
community c such as the community’s type, the creation time,
the number of members, and so on. In the XML-based specifi-
cation shown in the Appendix B, a community type defines its
goal and necessary roles (CR). The constraints on correspond-
ing CR assignments (CRA) are described in a community type
definition. According to those constraints, a community
invites suitable agents for each CR to accomplish its goal. Thecommunity then selects themost appropriate agents based on
contexts and tasks of agents. After receivingan invitation from
a community, every agentmust decidewhether or not itwants
to participate. This decision ismadebasedon anagent’s ability
and its preference. The CRs are revoked from agents when the
community is terminated or an agent leaves the community.
When an administrator assigns roles to agents, he/she should
consider the relationships between the agent’s tasks and
permissions. In order to performsomeagent’s tasks, particular
permissions may be required. Accordingly, an administrator
should be careful to only assign the necessary permissions to
the agents’ tasks when he/she administers the role assign-
ments. Note that CRiBAC does not allow changes in the
assignment relationships of community roles after a com-
munity’s cooperation has been initiated.
An agent has its own resources, contexts, and tasks that it
can perform. An agent’s resources are a set of objects which
belong to the agent and it is controlled by that agent. An agent
also has its own contexts that capture specific information
such as status and identification, and its tasks to show what
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can play one or more SRs and CRs. If a role is assigned to an
agent based on the agent’s tasks, then the assigned permis-
sions to the role should include the permissions necessary to
perform the agent’s tasks.
Permissions in CRiBAC are of two types: traditional OPRMS
and interaction permissions. The interaction permissions include
the resource-oriented permission (SPRMS ), RPRMS, and
TPRMS, as shown in Fig. 4. A sprms is a permission that allows
access to agents’ resources; the remaining two interaction
permissions are the same as those in RiBAC. Agents can
interact with each other by having interaction permissions.
Actually, some permissions are parameterized based on roles,
not specific objects. In such a case, the parameterized
permissions should be interpreted with real agents who are
assigned to the corresponding role, after the role assignment.
Additionally, in this model, we assume that cooperating
agents share their information such as their tasks, contexts,
and permissions during interactions by using a centralized
server which belongs to a community. Similar to RiBAC
family, CRiBAC has four models: CRiBAC-B, CRiBAC-H,
CRiBAC-C, and CRiBAC-CH. In this paper, we present the
specification of CRiBAC-CH in the Appendix B.4.2. Example scenarios
To emphasize the necessity for CRiBAC, we present two
example scenarios calling for urgent cooperation: The Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) and Disaster Relief.
4.2.1. UPMC scenario
We assume that there is a large-scale CCS for UPMC and that
all the doctors and nurses who work for UPMC are categorized
into several groups according to their specialties as shown in
Fig. 5. We assume that all the employees have their ownFig. 5 e The UPMC Expersonal devices where an agent is hosted for supporting
information sharing and cooperation among them.
Let’s assume that there are five communities: BS, LS, A, N,
BW and many agents including patients, caretakers, phar-
macists, patrolmen, etc., in UPMC. At the time ti-1, some
agents can interact with others. For example, Kevin, an
examiner of bacteriological weapons (BWE ), can culture
bacteria and then preserve or kill the cultured bacteria. If Bill
requests the cultivation or elimination of a type of bacteria,
then Kevin can perform the requested task. However, he has to
ignore requests to do this if the requests come from patients
or patrolmen. In order to do so, we should allow only autho-
rized agents to have access to an agent’s tasks such as bacteria
cultivation. Further, we need to ensure that only authorized
agents can perform tasks on other agents. For example, a4 is
a patient who had brain surgery and Bill and Jane are in charge
of his care. Jane is permitted to give an injection to a4 and Bill is
allowed to prescribe medicine for a4. However, other agents
must be prohibited from doing these tasks even if they are
medical doctors or nurses. Note that it is necessary to guar-
antee the secure interactions among agents but existing
models do not deal with interactions among roles. They focus
on protecting only resources from unauthorized agents, but
do not bar access to the agents’ tasks or agents themselves.
To ensure security during cooperation in CCSs, we need
to consider the community-related aspects as well. Consider
an example scenario described as follows. The Emergency
Brain and Lung Surgery community (EBLS ) for Bob, who is
the chief lung surgeon, is created as soon as Bob is injured.
To organize the community, an administrator tries to
employ three chief medical doctors for the Emergency Brain
Surgeon (EBS ) role, the Emergency Lung Surgeon (ELS ) role,
and the Emergency Anesthetist (EA) role, respectively. At
this time, Bill and Bob are not available to play the emer-
gency surgeon roles, EBS and ELS, in that community. Bill is
the chief brain surgeon but he is participating in, say, theample of CRiBAC.
R1 (ops, R1.P1) R1 R 2(ops, R2.P2) (ops, R1.P1)
Fig. 6 e Examples of SRI problems.
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Weapon Examiner (BWE ) at that time. Because of the threat
of infection, people who are involved in the Bacteriological
Weapon (BW ) community should be prohibited from
working as a surgeon; therefore, Alice, who is available,
assumes the EBS role in the EBLS community instead of Bill.
For the ELS role, Tim is chosen since Bob, who was a chief
lung surgeon, is a patient. As can be seen in this example,
information related to the community e such as existing
assignments, relationships between agents and communi-
ties or community roles e is critical when trying to assign
agents to create a new community. When an agent receives
a request to participate in a community, that agent might
also need information such as the critical importance of the
proposed community, the suggested community role to be
assumed, and the identification of the other participants.
Knowing such information helps an agent to decide whether
he/she wants to accept the request or not. For instance, John
receives a participation request as a presenter from the
chief meeting community of a chief nurse and a chief
anesthetist (CMNA) after the creation of EBLS community.
However, he declines the request since he already belongs
to the EBLS community whose priority is higher than the
priority of the CMNA community.
The community information is also important when an
administrator controls access to resources or an agent decides
whether or not he/she will allow an interaction access from
others. For example, an administrator can allow only agents in
the EBLS community to access Bob’s medical information.
Accordingly, Bob can reject a request for an interaction from
Anna, an anesthetist, since she does not belong to the same
community. As can be seen, in many cases, the consideration
and explicit specification about interaction and cooperation
among agents are necessary for efficient access control in
cooperative MASs. The CRiBAC specification of UPMC example
is presented in the Appendix C-1.
4.2.2. Disaster relief scenario
This growth in online SNSs bringsmany changes in patterns of
communication and human behavior. Cooperation amongFig. 7 e Examples oflarge number of globally connected people through online
SNSs provides an unprecedented opportunity for significant
social transformations. SNSsprovide ahugepool ofmanpower
and quick delivery of information, thereby, allowing a solid
basis for immediate cooperation among users. For example,
many people are using Twitter to broadcast information about
their lost pets and ask for help finding them, such as Lost Dog
Found and Fidofinder. Another example where the use online
SNS has resulted in immediate cooperation among people
relates to Healthcare domain (Emory Healthcare, 2011):
a medical doctor who works for Emory Healthcare received
a tweet from a man, Matthew, about an emergency situation
involving his grandmother. A medical team communicated
with Matthew via Twitter to instruct him on life-saving emer-
gency first aid while emergency transportation was arranged.
The doctor said, “Without the quickness of social media, the
helicopter may have never been dispatched”. As can be seen
from the aforementioned examples, online SNSs have an
enormous potential for helping people by supporting dynamic
and immediate cooperation among users.
Although these examples show significant promise for
social cooperation in SNSs, there exist no cooperation
models for SNSs that ensures effective and secure cooper-
ation. To date, cooperation among users has been achieved
only in an ad hoc manner. Meaningful cooperation cannot
be guaranteed by such an approach. In addition, security
issues must be considered. Allowing access to individuals’
information and resources to the public during cooperation
may raise serious privacy and access control problems. By
using CRiBAC, we are able to resolve the aforementioned
problems on existing cooperation on online SNSs. CRiBAC
allows to specify cooperation among users and security
policies necessary for protecting users’ information and
resources during cooperation. For better understanding of
the usefulness of CRiBAC, we present an example of coop-
eration among users of an online SNS, in particular Face-
book, for disaster relief as follows.
Let’s assume that a man is injured. He posts on an online
SNS using his mobile phone to ask for help. Many people
who see the post spread it to let more people know hisSRSA problems.
Fig. 8 e Examples of SRMA problems.
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ward, other victims, including a seriously injured woman,
ask for help simultaneously in many different places. To
successfully achieve the goal of this cooperation, the mostFig. 9 e Examples of extracted implicit TPRMSsuitable cooperative services are offered to every victim as
soon as possible. In order to do so, it is important to orga-
nize a cooperative group of volunteer users who are close to
a victim and are capable of giving necessary aid includings and corresponding TPRMS replacement.
Fig. 10 e Administration of a CCS by SM and CM.
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Fig. 11 e The administration model for CRiBAC (ACRiBAC).
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have posted earlier, others’ chances of being rescued
become less likely. Even though a victim has many helpers,
the lack of vital aid may lead to an overall failure in coop-
eration. For efficient and secure disaster relief, we can
specify a cooperative SNS by employing CRiBAC as shown in
the Appendix C-2.5. Analysis on interaction permissions
In the literature, potential problems related to permissions
such as concurrent execution of conflicting operations have
been studied and some of them have been solved by
constraints such as history-based constraints, SSoD or DSoD.
We can apply constraints existing in RBAC to CRiBAC since
CRiBAC includes all the properties of RBAC. However, the
additional interaction permissions that CRiBAC includes have
not been analyzed in the literature; thus, we will analyze the
problems related to interaction permissions and provide
solutions in this section.
Constrained CRiBAC supports the SoD constraints
including SSoD and DSoD. The SoD constraints are the same as
those in RiBAC-C. We refine the cardinality constraints of
RiBAC-C into the Agent Cardinality (AC ) constraint as shown
in DEF 1. It aims to limit the number of agents that can be
assigned to a certain role, and it is applied to the Agent-Role
Assignment (AA), in the same way as the SoD constraint (For
more details, see Fig. 11).
DEF 1. Agent cardinality (AC) constraint for a role.There are several potential problems that may result
from the interaction permissions or relationships among
them. These include Self-Referencing Interaction (SRI ),
Single-Role and Single-Agent Interaction (SRSA), Single-Role
and Multi-Agent Interaction (SRMA), and Implicit TPRMS
Problem. The formal definitions of each problem are shown
in DEF 2.
- Self-Referencing Interaction (SRI) e This problem is that
a tprms recursively invokes itself. It happens when a tprms
and its object permission (obj-prms) are actually the same.
If the obj-prms of a tprms invokes to another tprm, a refer-
encing chain is formed. If the end of the chained refer-
encing refers to its beginning, the original tprms, is
a chained SRI. If an agent has an interaction permission
experiencing the SRI problem, it recursively carries out
referencing. In Fig. 6, we can see two examples of the SRI
problem. The first one is referred to as the SRI problem
where a tprms invokes itself as its object permission. The
latter is an example of the chained SRI problem. If an SRI
problem is discovered, then the corresponding PA rela-
tionship(s) has to be modified.
- Single-Role and Single-Agent Interaction (SRSA) e The SRSA
problem is that only one agent is assigned to both a subject
role and an object role. It occurs when an agent is assigned
to a subject role. Here, if the subject role refers to itself as its
object role or its TPRMS eventually invokes itself as its object
permission, then the SRSA problem occurs. The formal
definition of the SRSA problem is as follows. As shown in
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an agent interacts with itself; in truth, this is really not an
interaction. This situation is not different from that of an
agent who plays a subject role in executing its own tasks.
This problem might not directly relate to serious security
fraud or system error, but it is logically incorrect. To resolve
it, an administrator should check the role-permission
assignments (PA) and agent cardinality (AC ) constraints. If
an SRSA is found, the administrator should modify the
corresponding policies.
- Single-Role and Multi-Agent Interaction Problem (SRMA)
Problem e The SRMA problem is similar to SRSA, but in
this problem, two or more agents are assigned to a subject
role and an object role, simultaneously. Consider Fig. 8(1),
which shows the SRMA problem on an rprms. R1 has P1 ˛
RPRMS, and P1’s object role is R1. It looks like a SRSR
problem, but R1 has three agents. Fig. 8(2) presents the
SRMA problem in a tprms. R1 is a subject role and becomes
its final object role which has the final object permission
of P1, P2. CRiBAC interprets this problem as a situation
where all of the agents who are assigned to a subject role
have a corresponding interaction permission to interact
with each other. In order to solve this problem, CRiBAC
distributes an interaction permission having a SRMA
problem to all of the agents who are assigned to the
subject role of the interaction permission. We call it the
Permission Distribution (PD). To better understand, we
present the example solutions by PD of SRMA in Fig. 8. For
the SRMA problem on RPRMS, an rprms P1 ˛ RPRMS is
distributed to each agent as shown in Fig. 8(1). It means
that all of the agents who are assigned to a subject role
and an object role have P1 to perform their operation ops
on another agent who takes R1. In case of the SRMA
problem on a tprms, all agents have P1 ˛ TPRMS to invoke
a task by other agents who play role R1 as presented inProblem Object Condition
SRI TPRMS If tprm¼ (ops, obj-prms) ˛ TP
h tprm where obj-prms ˛ TP
SRSA RPRMS If (sub-role, rprms) ˛ PA & su
& agt_card(sub-role) ¼ 1 whe
role ˛ R & agt_card(sub_role)
TPRMS If (sub-role, tprms) ˛ PA & (s
final-obj-prms) ˛ PA & sub-r
role & agt_card(sub-role) ¼ 1
obj-role ˛ R & final-obj-prms
agt_card(sub_role) ˛ AC
SRMA RPRMS If (sub-role, rprms) ˛ PA & su
& 2  agt_card(sub-role) &{(a
1 i , n 2} ˛ARA, where
˛ R & agt_card (sub-role) ˛ A
TPRMS If sub-roleh final-obj-role &
˛ PA & (sub-role, tprms. final
& 2  agt_card(sub-role) & {(
1  i  n, n  2} ˛ ARA, whe
role ˛ R & agt_card(sub-role)
Implicit TPRMS TPRMS If {(ri, pj)j1 i n, 1 jm,
j1  j  nm, 3  n} ˛ TPRMS
1  j  nm-2, 3  n} ˛ TPRM
obj-prms; TPRMSFig. 8(2). By PD, each agent who is assigned to R1 can
interact with other.
- Implicit Tprms Problem e If a tprms invokes other roles’
tasks in a sequence, we can determine a new tprms. We
refer to such a tprms obtained from a chain of tprmss as
implicit tprms. If an implicit tprms is found, then it should
be replaced with an existing tprms. We call it the TPRMS
Replacement (TR). To guarantee the security of a system,
an administrator should extract all implicit tprmss. If an
agent participates in multiple communities, a chain of
tprmss might be spread over several communities. In this
case, an administrator should check all the implicit tprmss
across communities. Fig. 10 indicates two examples of
the implicit tprms. In Fig. 9(1), R1 has P1 ˛ TPRMS but P1
invokes another tprms P2. Also, P2 invokes P3 ˛ TPRMS
and P3 invoke P4. It means that P1, P2, and P3 eventually
invoke P4. We refer to this relationship among such
connected tprmss e which are invoked one after another
e as a tprms chain. In the example, four tprmss; P1, P2, P3,
P4, form a tprms chain and P1 and P2 are replaced by an
implicit tprms ¼ (ops, R4.P4). A tprms chain can be made
across communities as shown in Fig. 9(2). The
a community has four members; A1(RI), A2(RII), A5(RIII),
A6(RV), and the b community includes A2(RA), A3(RB),
A4(RC), A5(RD). As a member of a, A1 has P1 through the PA
between I and P1. Similarly, A5 has P5 and A6 has P6. In b,
A2 has P2 and A4 has P4. As you can see in this example,
although tprmss are assigned to different roles which are
involved in different communities, they can form a tprms
chain. We should extract all implicit tprmss across the
communities, and then replace existing tprmss with
implicit tprmss.
DEF 2. Problems on interaction permissions and corre-
sponding solutions.Solution
RMS & obj-prms
RMS
An administrator should modify the
corresponding PA relationship(s).
b-roleh obj-role
re sub-role, obj-
˛ AC
An administrator should modify the
corresponding role-permission
assignments (PA) and/or agent cardinality
(AC ) constraints.ub-role, tprms.
ole h final-obj-
where sub-role,
˛ P &
b-roleh obj-role
i, sub-role)j
sub-role, obj-role
C
Permission Distribution (PD):
{assign(ai,(ops, aiþ1))j 1  i  n-1} &
assign(an, (ops, a1))
(sub-role, tprms)
-obj-prms) ˛ PA
ai, sub-role)j
re sub-role, obj-
˛ AC
Permission Distribution (PD):
{assign(ai,(ops, aiþ1.tprms))j1  i  n-1} &
assign (an, (ops,a1.tprms))
3 n} ˛ PA & {pj
, {(pj.obj-prms)j
S, and pj. final-
TPRMS Replacement (TR): {revoke(ri, pj)j
1  i  n, 3  n, 1  j  nm-1} & {assign(ri,
pip)j 1  i  n-1, 3  n}, where pip ¼ (ops,
final-obj-prms) ˛ TPRMS is an implicit TPRMS
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In order to apply CRiBAC to large-scale cooperative systems,
an administrationmodel is necessary. Existing administration
models for RBAC are relatively well-defined, but they are not
able to manage the interaction permission and cooperation of
CRiBAC since RiBAC does not deal with them. In this paper, we
therefore propose an administration model for CRiBAC, called
ACRiBAC.
Before we specify the administration model in detail, we
first give an overview of the administration model of CCS
since cooperation in CRiBAC is based on it. The administration
model of community computing is somewhat decentralized,
having two different types of administrators: Society Manager
(SM ) and Community Manager (CM ). SM is the more impor-
tant and only one SM manages a CCS. SM supervises system-
wide matters such as maintaining agent information and
interactions among agents, constructing new communities,
creating community managers, and so on. For each commu-
nity, one CM takes responsibility for community matters such
as recruitment of community members, cooperation
management, community termination, and so on. An
example of a CCS maintained by one SM and several CMs is
shown in Fig. 10.
6.1. Administration model of CRiBAC (ACRiBAC)
To align with the administration model of community
computing, ACRiBAC employs both SM and CM. A SM takes
responsibility for controlling agent registration in a society
(ARG), Community Registration in a society (CRG), Society Role-
to-Society Assignment/Revocation (RSA), Agent-to-Society
Role Assignment/Revocation (SRA), Community Role-to-
Community Assignment/Revocation (RCA), Agent-to-
Community Role Selection (CRS ), Role-to-Permission Assign-
ment (PA), CM creation/deletion, and RHmaintenance. On the
other hand, a CM has responsibility for the creation and
termination of a community, Agent to Community Role
Assignment (CRA), and Permission Realization (PR). TheTable 4 e The administration model for CRiBAC (ACRiBAC).
Relation Definition
SM PA OPA W SPA W RPA
W TPA 4 R  P
AA SRA W CRA
ARG 4A  S
ARA SRA W CRA 4 A  R
SRA 4A  SR
ACA 4A  C
RSA 4SR  S
RCA 4CR  C
CM CRA 4A  CR
CRG C  S
PR 4parameterized P  Poverview of ACRiBAC is shown in Fig. 11 and its formal defi-
nition is presented in Table 4.
The detailed description of relationships between different
modeling elements in ACRiBAC is as follows.
- CRG (Community to a Society Registration): All communities
existing in a society should register their information such
as their goals, cooperation processes, necessary roles, and
assigned agents with the SM of the society at the onset. As
you can see in the Appendix B, the community’s goal,
cooperation process, and necessary roles are specified for
each community type in the Community_Types part of Soci-
ety_Contexts (see Appendix B(i)), for an instance, see the
specification of the EBLS community type (see Appendix C-
1(i). In addition, all member agents that are actually
assigned to a community are specified in the CR_Assignment
part of a community’s specification, for example, see EBLS
community (see Appendix C-1).
- ARG (Agent Registration to a society): All agents that join
a society should register their information such as their
own resources, contexts, and tasks with the SM. Informa-
tion about all the agents is specified in the Agents part of
CRiBAC description (see Appendix B(c), for an example, you
can see the agent specifications for Bob, Bill, and Kevin in the
Appendix C-1(b). To protect the privacy of agents, only the
SM can access all the information about all agents such as
an agent’s identification, contexts, tasks, society role(s),
community role(s), and so on. However, an agent can access
a society’s objects if the corresponding SPRMS are granted.
Since every agent in a society must have one or more
society roles, SRA always follows ARG for each agent.
- RSA (SR to Society Assignment): The SM can assign society
roles to a society to achieve the long-term and global goal of
the society. All society roles are specified in the Society_Roles
part of Society_Contexts as shown in the Appendix B(h). For
examples, some society roles of UPMC are specified in the
Appendix C-1(d).
- SRA (Agent to SR Assignment): Every agent should be
assigned to one or more society role(s) based on their tasksDescription
A many-to-many role to permission assignment relationship,
where OPA4 R  OPRMS, SPA 4 R  SPRMS, RPA 4 R  RPRMS,
and TPA 4 R  TPRMS.
A many-to-many agent to R assignment relationship.
A many-to-one agent to society registration.
A many-to-many agent to role assignment relationship.
A many-to-many agent to SR assignment relationship.
A many-to-many agent who a candidate member to community
assignment relationship.
A many-to-one society role to society assignment relationship.
A many-to-many community role to community assignment
relationship.
A many-to-many agent to CR assignment relationship.
A many-to-one community to society registration.
A one-to-many parameterized permission to
real permission realization.
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are specified in the SR-Assignment part of the Society_-
Contexts (see Appendix B(h). For example, a SRA for the
society role D is shown in the Appendix C-1(h). By SRA and
corresponding PA, each agent has the necessary permis-
sion(s) to play his/her society role(s).
- RCA (CR to Community Assignment): The SM should assign
necessary roles for each community type. The RCAs for
a community typeare specified in theCommunity_Rolespartof
a Community_Type description (see the Appendix B(i)). For
examples, you can see the corresponding RCAs for the BS and
theBWcommunity types in theAppendixC-1(c2).RCA should
be executed before the SM enforces CRS for the community.
- CRS (Agent to CR Selection): CRS is performed as a basis for
the agent to CR assignment (ACA). That is,ACA is performed
by RCA and CRS. Before the assignment of agents to
community roles (CRA), the SM selects candidate agents for
every community role based on the agents’ information,
which is stored in SM, such as their contexts, tasks, society
role(s), or community role(s) at the time. For privacy
protection of agents, only the SM can access information
about all agents and select proper candidates.
- CRA (Agent to CR Assignment): A CM assigns the most
suitable agent(s) among candidate agents selected by CRS to
each community role, according to the criteria for each
assignment, which is specified in the Community_Type
description. A CRA for each CR is specified in the CR_As-
signment part of a Community description (see Appendix
B(c)). For example, a CRA for the EBS community role is
specified as shown in the Appendix C-1(c1).
- PA (Role to Permission Assignment): It is same as PA in NIST
RBAC, and is enforced by SM. All PAs are specified in the
Permission_Assignments description (see Appendix B(f)). For
example, we present the part of PAs for a UPMC example in
Appendix C-1(f).
- PR (Permission Realization): After a CM performs CRA, it
interprets all the role-based parameterized permissions
assigned to all the community roles and then realizes those
permissions with real agents assigned to each community
role.
A SM deals with ARG, RSA, SRA, RCA, CRS, and PA. A CM
handles CRA and CRG for each community. To preserve the
least privilege rule, unnecessary agents or roles should be
removed or revoked.Table 5 e Algorithms for society administration.6.2. Administration of cooperation
In this section, we show how agents’ cooperation is supported
by the ACRiBAC model. To maintain society-level matters, an
SM executes several functions such as agent registration,
community registration, establishing a community manager,
RSA, SRA, RCA, CRS, and PA. In this section, we present the
algorithms for society administration; AReg, UnAReg,
CMCreate, and CMTerminate.
When a SM receives a request for registration within
a society from an outside agent, it executes the AReg algo-
rithm. In AReg, the SM assigns an agent to a suitable society
role(s) depending on the agent’s tasks and contexts and then
saves information about the agent. If the agent leaves the
society, the SM executes unAReg to revoke all permissions
associated with agent’s society role(s). The CMCreate algo-
rithm is executed to generate a community manager agent
when a SM receives a request to create a community from an
agent who recognizes a need for a community. To complete
a community manager agent (CM ), the SM performs RCA
according to the community’s goal, and then selects candi-
dates for each community role. After a community is dis-
solved, the SM deletes its CM. We describe those algorithms in
Table 5.
To create a community, the CM created by the SM performs
the CommCreate algorithm. In this algorithm, the CM assigns
the most suitable agent(s) to each community role and then
induces the agent’s permissions with the assigned role
members. Once a community achieves its goal or reaches
a failure state, its CM terminates it by using algorithm Comm-
Terminate. These two algorithms are presented in Table 6.7. Implementation of CRiBAC prototype
System
In this section, we describe our prototype system which was
developed in order to test a variety of policies based on the
proposed CRiBAC model. This system tests not only access
control policies but also the process of policy enforcement in
a CCS, and then simulates cooperation among agents to
ensure enforcement of the specified policies. It is developed
on the JDK 1.6 platformand also uses the JADE platform for the
simulation of the CCS.
Table 6 e Algorithms for community administration.
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1) Developing CCSs e To test its policies, we first need an
operating CCS. To build CCSs on the developed prototype
system, an administrator creates all the elements such as
a society, communities, and members (agents), and
describes cooperation amongmembers in a community. At
this time, we simulate the behavior of agents instead of
actually implementing the behavioral actions of agents as
our ultimate goal is to test CRiBAC policies rather than to
test a CCS. After developing a CCS, a tester can see how the
systemoperates through the user interface of our prototype
system. Since the developed CCS is connected to the CRi-
BAC engine, all agents in CCS can acquire proper permis-
sions to access resources or other agents through this
engine for interacting and cooperating with agents.
2) CRiBAC Administration e By using the developed proto-
type, developers can easily design CRiBAC policies and test
them by simulating a corresponding CCS. More specific
functions for access control and object management are
described as follows.
- Role Management e CRiBAC can manage a role set by
creating, modifying, and deleting roles. For each role, all
related information are defined including access control
policies as well as the role’s capabilities, contexts, objects,
and cooperation.
- Permission Management e It can manage a set of permissions
by creating, modifying, and deleting permissions. The
permission set includes three types of permissions which
are defined in CRiBAC: object-oriented (OPRMS ), role-
oriented (RPRMS ), and task-oriented (TPRMS ) permissions.
- Agent Management e It can manage a group of agents by
creating, updating, and deleting agents. Agents in CRiBAC
are identical to members in a CCS; therefore, every change
in members in a CCS is reflected to agents in CRiBAC
simultaneously.
- Session Management e It manages all sessions which are
assigned to agents who play a certain role in a society.
- Object Management e In CRiBAC, the set of objects includes
society objects and agent’s objects; both can be a target of
an access. Accordingly, it should be managed by two types
of objects separately.
3) Policy Definition and Enforcement e A tester can define
CRiBACpoliciesbyutilizingauser interfaceandfileoperation
of the prototype system, including assignment relationships
such as the agent-role assignment (AA) and the role-
permission assignment (PA). According to these policies,
each access will be permitted or denied in a CCS.
4) Policy Analysis e The prototype system provides an anal-
ysis of the specified policies before they are applied to an
actual system. Through this analysis, we can identifyconflicts between policies or problems which can cause
a serious security fault such as the self-referencing and
chained referencing problem. By testing policies before
deploying them, a developer can reduce the cost of devel-
opment and maintenance.
5) Policy Enforcement and System Monitoring e The proto-
type system can enforce CRiBAC policies while a commu-
nity computing system is operating. During the operation,
a developer can monitor all events in a CCS through the
agent interface such as community creation, member
registration, and policy enforcement.
7.2. System architecture
For better understanding of our prototype system, we present
its architecture inFig. 12. Theprototypesystemconsists of three
parts: user interface; CCS Framework including community
computing system, CRiBAC engine, and knowledge-base; and
JADE Agent platform. The detailed explanation about each
element is as follows.
7.2.1. CCS framework
The CCS Framework consists of a CCS, CRiBAC Engine, and
Knowledge-Base.Anadministrator canmanageCRiBACpolicies
andKnowledge-Base aswell asCCS through theuser interface. It
can also simulate a CCS on the Jade Agent Platform at runtime.
- CCS e It manages communities and agents in a CCS and
maintains information related to Community Computing.
The Role Repository stores information about all roles
participating in the cooperation process as well as access
control policies. We note that CCS and CRiBAC engines
share this role repository. It means that the definition of
roles is used for cooperation as well as access control.
- CRiBAC Engine e It aims to control all types of accesses
according to the defined policies, object-oriented accesses as
well as interaction accesses. A system administrator defines
CRiBAC policies through the Policy Authority Point (PAP)
Module, and those policies are stored in the Policy Repository.
If an agent needs to get permission, it should send a request
for the access to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The PEP
Module then delivers the agent’s request to the Policy Deci-
sion Point (PDP) with information about the agent and its
request. The PDPModule decides whether or not to grant the
required permission. Tomake a decision, the PDP fetches the
corresponding policies from Policy Repository and evaluates
them by using the relevant context information retrieved
from the Context Server. After reasoning about policies, PDP
conveys the result to the PEP, and the PEP performs autho-
rization by granting the requested permissions. The detailed
CRiBAC Engine is shown in Fig. 13.
Community Computing System Framework
User Interface
CCS
Jade Agent Platform
CRiBAC Engine
Policy 
RepositoryRole Repository
Society
Knowledge-Base (Context-Server)
Communities
administration
Agent-role assignment
context context
(1) (2)
Fig. 12 e Architecture of CRiBAC prototype system.
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taining and inferring context used for describing cooperation
and defining and enforcing policies. In this module, context
information is represented by a key-value model as follows:
<context-name, context-value>. A variety of context informa-
tion is required, so that CCS and the CRiBAC engine may
perform many operations such as community creation, role
assignment, permission assignment, and policy enforce-
ment. The Context Server provides the necessary context
information by gathering context information from the
environment andagents and reasoningabout those contexts.
7.2.2. Jade agent platform
To develop agents in a CCS, we have used the JADE agent
platform. The JADE platform is one of the most popular agent
platforms and is widely used for developing, simulating, and
testing multi-agent systems. It follows FIPA standard and also
supports diverse and unique features of the agents. In our
previous work, we have developed a complete CCS based on
the JADE platform. In this work, we simulate an agent’s
behaviors because the developed prototype system is more
focused on testing access control policies than testing an
agent’s cooperation. That is, agents simply inform their
actions or the action’s results, but do not perform actualAgent
PEP P
Rep
PDP
Access  Request
reference
Jade Platform
Authorization
evaluate cond
Fig. 13 e CRiBAactions. In this prototype, a society is developed as a Jade
agent container; each community and agent is implemented
as a Jade agent. In addition, the administration of CCS through
the user interface (such as community creation or agent
registration) is simultaneously reflected in corresponding
agent containers and agents in JADE platform.
7.2.3. User interface (UI)
The proposed prototype system has a variety of UI compo-
nents to design and test CCSs and corresponding CRiBAC
policies. The UI is roughly divided into four sections as shown
in Fig. 14: Society tree, Permission Management Component,
Assignment Management Component, and Display console.
- Society tree e presents a CCS as including a society,
communities and agents. The society tree can be used for
administrating entities in a CCS by adding, modifying, and
removing elements of the society; such as communities and
agents. At this time, communities and agents in the society
tree are synchronized with the JADE agent GUI so that an
administrator accomplishes tasks through the JADE GUI
and resulting changes are reflected in the society tree.
- Permission Management Component e manages all permis-
sions in a CCS Framework. Each of permissions is defined by
a unique ID, permission type, subject role, and object role.
Through the UI, an administrator can define all types of
permissions that the CRiBAC model introduces.
- Assignment Management Component e an administrator can
handle Agent-Role Assignments (AA) and Role-Permission
assignments (PA). By performing AA, he can recruit suit-
able agents for each community role. In order to do so, the
AA component automatically searches through all proper
agents in a CCS to create easier and faster assignments.
Moreover, the PA component rapidly finds candidate roles
and a list of permissions; it helps an administrator to define
conditions to get certain permission.
- Display console e shows all changes in a CCS. Therefore, an
administrator cancheck the result ofadministrative behavior
andalsomonitor thesystem. Inorder toavoidmistakesby the
administrator, significant changes are presented in red or
blue colored text. Through this console, all of the adminis-
trative behaviors, decisions on access requests, and cooper-
ative processes among agents are shown. By monitoring the
console, administrators can evaluate present policies and
also make a plan for further securing the systems.olicy 
ository PAP
Administrator
Define Policies
Context
Server
User Interface
ition
C engine.
Fig. 14 e Screenshot of the developed CRiBAC prototype system.
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To verify the feasibility of CRiBAC and ACRiBAC, we imple-
ment a compact CRiBAC system based on the UPMC scenario
presented in Section 4.2.1. For better understanding, we
present a summary of our UPMC scenario-based demonstra-
tion in Table 7 and specifically describe operations of the
whole system as follows.
At t0, all agents that want to be involved register in the
UPMC Society through the UPMC Society Manager (SM ). In the
CRiBAC prototype system, a system administrator can register
an agent in a society by using the Register Member button in the
system’s UI (see Section 7.2.3 and Fig. 14(1)). The button trig-
gers an execution of AReg() shown in Table 5. Then, an
administrator is required to input an agent’s information such
as the agent’s name, contexts, and tasks so that the Jade agent
platform receives the information and creates a Jade agent
incorporating all of the delivered information (see Section
7.2.2 and Fig. 12(1)). Jade informs the SM of a new agent’s ID
(see Fig. 12(2)). Such agents’ information is specified by using
the proposed XML-based specification language (For exam-
ples, Bob, Bill, and Kevin specification in the Appendix C-1(b)),
and stored in the Context Sever. All registered agents are dis-
played in the Society Tree of UI (see Fig. 14(2)).
At t1, five communities, BS, LS, N, A, and BW, are generated
and registered by using the Create Community button for each
community (see Fig. 14(3)). As the button triggers an execution
of CMCreate(), a CM is created as a Jade agent with information
about thecorrespondingcommunity type, forexample, theEBLS
community type in the Appendix C-1(i). After being created,a CM communicates with all agents to recruit themost suitable
agents for a community according to the CRA_Constraint and
criteria specified in the Community_Type specification. At this
time, SM imparts an agent’s information to CM to assist with
identifyingsuitableagents toachieve thecommunity’s goal (See
CRS in Section 6.1). If CM gathers all necessary agents by
executing CommCreate() shown in Table 6, theCM informs SM of
information about the community. The delivered community
information isalso specifiedasanXMLsheet, for example,EBLS,
BS, and BW specification in the Appendix C-1(c). In a real-world
CCS, the community creation process is automatically per-
formed by CM; in our prototype system, an administrator
manually assigns community roles to agents through the
Assignment Management Component of UI (See Fig. 14(4)).
After creation, each community carries out its own coop-
eration at ti-1. Each agent involved in the community has a set
of permissions according to the CRiBAC policies and cooper-
ates with each other. Therefore, the corresponding permis-
sion assignment (PA) to each community role (CR) should be
done before a community creation. An administrator can
define permissions through the Permission Management (See
Fig. 14(5)), and all permissions are specified by the proposed
specification language, for examples, p1 and p5 in the
Appendix C-1(e). Then, an administrator assigns permissions
to roles through the Assignment Management Component in UI
and such assignments are specified in the Permission_Assign-
ments. For examples, pa1 presented in the Appendix C-1(f)
assigns p1, a RPRMS which performs write_prescription to
a patient (P), to the doctor (D). According to pa1, Bill can give
a prescription to a patient A4 but Carol cannot because she is
Table 7 e Example UPMC (University of Pittsburgh Medical Center) community scenario.
Time Situation
description
Interaction among agents Administration
t0 Agent
registration with
UPMC society
SM: For all agents,
AReg();
t1 Community
Creation and
Registration with
UPMC society
Brain Surgeon (BS),
Lung Surgeon (LS),
Anesthetist (A),
Nurse (N),
Bacteriological Weapon (BW)
1) SM: For each community, CMCreate();
2) BS_CM: CommCreate(BS );
LS_CM: CommCreate(LS );
A_CM: CommCreate(A);
N_CM: CommCreate(N );
BW_CM: CommCreate(BW );
ti1 In UPMC society,
five communities
exist and some
agents are
interacting or
cooperating with
each other.
Bill/aKevin’s task (bacteria cultivation) Granted
A4/ Kevin’s task (bacteria elimination) Denied
Bill’s task (prescription)/ A4 Granted
Carol’s task (prescription)/ A4 Denied
Community Community Roles Community Members Administration
BS Chief Brain Surgeon (CBS) Bill ongoing cooperation
Brain Surgeon (BS) Bill, Alice, A1
LS Chief Lung Surgeon (CLS) Bob ongoing cooperation
Lung Surgeon (LS) Bob, Tim, A3
A Chief Anesthetist (CA) John ongoing cooperation
Anesthetist (A) John, Anna, A2
N Chief Nurse (CN) Jane ongoing cooperation
Nurse (N) Carol
BW Bacteriological Weapon
Examiner (BWE)
Bill, Kevin ongoing cooperation
ti Bob is shot in the
head and chest,
so he needs to
have an
emergency
surgery.
Same as those at ti-1 SM: CMCreate(EBLS );
tiþ1 An “emergency
surgery
community” for
Bob’s brain and
lung injuries is
dynamically
created
Emergency Brain and
Lung Surgery (EBLS)
Emergency Brain
Surgeon (EBS)
Alice EBLS_CM:
CommCreate(EBLS );
Emergency Lung
Surgeon (ELS)
Tim
Emergency
Anesthetist (EA)
John
Emergency Nurse (EN) Carol
Emergency Patient (EP) Bob
LS CLS Noneb LS_CM: Deactivate(CLS );
LS Tim, A3
Other Four Communities Same as those at ti-1 Ongoing cooperation
tiþ2 A meeting
community is
organized
between the
nurse group and
the anesthetist
group but fails to
take place
Chief Meeting Community
between Nurses and
Anesthetists (CMNA)
Presenter Nonec 1) SM: CMCreate(CMNA);
2) CMNA_CM:
CommCreate(CMNA);
¼> FAIL
Audience Jane
EBLS Ongoing cooperation
Other four communities Same as ti1
a / Means an interaction access by another agent.
b Bob is not able to perform his roles due to his injury.
c John was expected, but he is not available.
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cultivate_bacteria operation if Bill asks to do but he will reject
the request from A4 because A4 is not a CBWE.
At ti, an EBLS community is required to handle the emer-
gency situation that Bob, who is a chief in the Lung surgeon
community (LS ), sustains serious injuries. To do this, SM
creates a CM for an EBLS community, called EBLS_CM, by
operating CMCreate(EBLS). The EBLS_CM organizes itscommunity through the assignment of community roles to
agents at tiþ1. At this moment, LS_CM perceives the change in
Bob’s contexts and capabilities, for example, the change in the
health_condition context from good to injured. Accordingly,
LS_CM deactivates the CRA of Bill to LS because Bill is no longer
satisfiedwith the assignment condition of LS. In our prototype
system, an administrator manually deactivates a role through
the Role Assignment Component (See Fig. 14(4)).
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scheduled but fails since John who takes the presenter role in
the community is unavailable. At that time, John is working for
an EBLS community and the community is a higher priority.
Therefore, John denies the request for participation from
CMNA_CM. Other communities keep cooperating with each
other. All events such as the administrator’s modification,
community creation, and community’s failure are described
in the Console of UI (See Fig. 14(6)). An administrator can
monitor all processes occurring in the system including
cooperation among agents and results of policy enforcement.8. Related work
All With the increasing interest in agent cooperation, several
cooperative systems have been developed; for example, group-
wares (Greenberg, 1991) of CSCW such as videoconferencing
softwareormulti-agent-basedcooperationsystemssuchasGaia
(Zambonelli et al., 2003) and SuperSpace (Roman and Campbell,
2000). For practical use of these systems, it is necessary to apply
an appropriate securitymodel. In Tolone et al. (2005), the author
specifies access control requirements for collaboration and
compares existing access control models such as TMAC (Team-
based Access Control Model) (Thomas, 1997), TBAC (Task-based
Access Control Model) (Thomas and Sandhu, 1997), RBAC (Role-
based Access Control Model) (Sandhu et al., 1996), and the
context-aware access control model (Covington et al., 2001).
As pointed out in Tolone et al. (2005), TBAC has some
drawbacks to being used in cooperation systems. The major
drawback is thedifficulty individingcooperation into taskswith
usage counts. Second, TBAC specifies diverse but restricted
context information related to tasks, activities, or workflows.
However, cooperation systems need to capture much richer
contexts. TMAC and Context-based TMAC (Georgiadis et al.,
2001) include access control schemes for groups/teams of
users who can take on different roles. However, they do not
adequately handle dynamic and rich cooperation, because they
do not have a flexible access control or administration models.
In addition, they capture only limited context information.
RBAC is an attractivemodel for cooperation systems because it
encourages intuitive design, convenient administration, and
can support more fine-grained and diverse access control
requirements. However, current RBAC models lack flexibility
with regard to dynamic changes associated with cooperation.
GTRBAC and GEO-RBAC (Damian et al., 2007) are extended
RBAC models that address temporal and spatial contexts.
DRBAC (Zhang and Parashar, 2004) allows real-time adjustment
of user assignment as well as permission assignment by
dynamic activation of roles or permissions based on environ-
ment contexts called ENVS. Covington et al. (2001) introduces
context-aware role validation and activation using Environment
Roles as well as user-role assignment in the GTRBAC model.
Another context-aware access control model is CA-RBAC
(Kulkarni and Tripathi, 2008) which was developed to support
the needs of pervasive computing systems based on dynami-
cally changing contexts during runtime. However, thosemodels
deal only with environmental contexts such as time, location,
and temperature rather than an individual’s private context
such as height, age, gender, preference, medical history, and soon. However, in cooperative systems, individual users’ contexts
can be important. For example, an individual’s task, status, or
current roles in other groups can be critical when a cooperative
group selects members to achieve its goal. If existing context-
aware models try to capture individuals’ contexts, they should
be described as public environment contexts and the number of
environmental contextsmay grow explosively. In addition to an
individual’s context, consideration of group cooperation is
required to control accesses incooperative systems.GB-RBAC(Li
et al., 2009) supports access for inter-group collaboration. It
assumes that many groups already exist in a system, and
concentrates on the administration of cooperative groups,
knownasVirtualGroups (VG).AVG isdynamically createdat the
outset by gathering roles and permissions from collaborating
groups, and the group is terminated as soon as it accomplishes
its goal. EachgroupadministratormanagesaVG. SinceGB-RBAC
is concerned with inter-group cooperation, it does not have
a way to create cooperative groups or to manage them when
there is no group. The more critical problem is that it does not
support context-awareness. When it creates a VG, administra-
tors from every collaborative group are elected as group
administrators of a VG. It means that a VG has more than one
administrator who makes decisions about User-Role assign-
ments and access control during cooperation. However, there is
nomention of how they decidewhen conflicting decisions arise.
Inaddition,DSet, a setofdefault rolesofaVG, is simplyaunionof
those participating groups. It enables all members in a VG to
have all permissions assigned to the collaborating groups’ DSet.
However, it could cause a serious security threat. Let’s suppose
a VG between a police group and a group of doctors are to take
care of a patient involved in a traffic accident. Doctors partici-
pating in the VG have permissions assigned to DSet of the police
group. For example, if thepermission to readpersonal profiles of
all citizens is assigned to a default role of the police group,
doctors in the VG might be able to read someone’s profile,
a potential unsecured access to that information.
Asyou can seeabove, context-awareness andunderstanding
of cooperation are simultaneously required for dynamic and
efficient control in cooperative systems. In order to do that, we
need an appropriate model reflecting both requirements at the
same time. CRiBAC is one of such access control models that
satisfy those requirements. It utilizes a range of contexts from
public ones such as ambient contexts or community-related
contexts to private contexts belonging to individuals. By using
various contexts, CRiBAC can guarantee dynamic and fine-
grained access control at runtime. Furthermore, it enables us
to control interaction and cooperation among users in cooper-
ative systems by reflecting the concept of community and role-
based cooperation of Community Computing.
g-SIS (Group-Centric Secure Information Sharing)
(Krishnan et al., 2009) also considers group-centric coopera-
tion. It assumes that users and information come together for
some common purposemuch like that of a cooperative group.
To determine authorization for shared information, it
proposes some semantics of group operation, such as join/
leave for users and add/remove for objects and the varieties of
those operations. g-SIS allows detailed access control to
shared information but it does not focus on context-aware
authorization or interaction control. Therefore, it can be
a complement to CRiBAC. CRiBAC can provide context-
Table 8 e Comparison of access control models for cooperation control.
Ambient context User’s context Context-awareness User’s object Group aspect Role interaction control
Environment roles O X Medium X X X
DRBAC O X Medium X X X
CA-RBAC O D (possible) High X X X
GB-RBAC X X X X O X
g-SIS X D (join/leave) Low X O X
RiBAC O X High O X O
CRiBAC O O Very High O O O
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while g-SIS can offer ways to manage the membership of
users and user’s objects in detail.
Currently, there is no existing access control model which
supports context-aware dynamic interaction or cooperation
among users. We propose RiBAC and CRiBAC in this paper
toward fulfilling this gap. In Table 8, we present a comparison
between existing models and our RiBAC and CRiBAC in terms
of context-awareness and cooperation.9. Conclusion and future work
Multi-agent technology has been considered as one of the
most promising research areas for the past few decades. An
agent’s cooperative and dynamic problem-solving behavior
has been the key to providing intelligent services in a variety
of application areas such as online business, e-government, e-
healthcare, etc. In particular, an agents’ ability to interact and
cooperate with other agents has enabled many MASs to solve
complex and large-scale problems (Zambonelli et al., 2003;
Kumar et al., 2003; Jung and Kim, 2010). The rapid growth of
technologies related to networking and smart devices has
accelerated rich social interactions among agents. For more
practical uses of MASs, the security for agents’ interactions
and cooperation is essential to allow only authorized social
interactions inMASs. As aforementioned in Section 8, existing
access control model do not however consider dynamic
interaction or cooperation. To guarantee secure interaction
and cooperation in MASs, in this paper, we propose two of
role-interaction based access control models, the RiBAC
model and the CRiBAC model, and provide an administration
model and policy analysis methods. Here, we briefly
summarize the major contributions of this paper as follows.
- RiBACmodel e To ensure the security of agent interactions,
we refineda family of RiBACmodels proposed in 2009. In this
model, an interaction among agents is also an entity to be
protected as well as objects. In order to do so, we proposed
a new type of permission, the interaction permission which
includes the role-oriented interaction permission (RPRMS)
and the task-oriented interaction permissions (TPRMS). For
better readability and extensibility, in this paper, we refined
the RiBACmodels and proposed an XML-based specification
language based on the notation of X-GTRBAC.
- CRiBACmodelewe proposed the CRiBACmodel to deal with
the context-aware secure cooperation among agents as well
as the secure interactions within a community setting. To do
so, CRiBAC employs the community concept of CommunityComputing (CC) as a cooperationmechanismofMASs. In this
model, the interaction permissions are classified into three
types: RPRMS, TPRMS, and reSource-oriented interaction
permission (SPRMS) for accessing an agent’s resource. CRi-
BAC contributes to securely organize a group of agents and
control accesses to participating agents during cooperation.
- ACRiBAC model e For the convenience of administration,
we proposed ACRiBAC to support the administration of
systems employing CRiBAC. In this model, we described the
grant and revocation model of CRiBAC and several algo-
rithms for administrating cooperation.
- CRiBAC policy analysis technique e we proposed the anal-
ysis techniques to verify the CRiBAC policies and also
propose the corresponding solutions.
- Visual user interfaces e we implemented visual user
interfaces for the convenient design and analysis of RiBAC
and CRiBAC policies.
- CRiBAC prototype system e To test the feasibility and
applicability of the proposed CRiBAC model, we imple-
mented a prototype of CRiBAC system based on an emer-
gency scenario in a hospital.
Although RiBAC and CRiBAC resolve the problem of
unauthorized access to agents’ resources, tasks, and agents
themselves during interaction and cooperation inMASs, a few
things still remain to be investigated:
- Trust or reputation-based access control on interactions and
cooperation among agents. The proposed models deal with
unauthorized interaction and cooperation based on roles
assigned to agents. However, trust or reputation can be good
criteria to allow interaction and cooperation among agents.
- Development of context ontology for CRiBAC. For practical
context-awareness of the CRiBACmodel, we plan to develop
some domain-specific context ontology.
- Development of diverse application systems for practical
verification of RiBAC and CRiBAC. To explore the feasibility
of the proposedmodels, it is necessary to demonstratemore
application systems working areas across of diverse group
of subject areas.Acknowledgements
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